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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
GINO JOSEPH MONTOYA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 960277-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions of two counts of aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995); one count of attempted aggravated 
kidnaping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995); and 
three counts of kidnaping, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 
(1995), with gun enhancements on the three first degree felonies, in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding (R. 181-89, addendum 
D). 
The case having been poured over by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, this Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
and 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Where, pursuant to a plea bargain, the State dismissed ten counts and abandoned 
all charges carrying minimum mandatory sentences, did the trial court reasonably impose 
consecutive sentences for the six remaining counts as recommended by AP&P? 
A reviewing court will "not disturb a sentence unless it exceeds that prescribed by law 
or unless the trial court has abused its discretion." State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 
1986); State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192-93 (Utah 1990); State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 
887-88 (Utah 1978). "An abuse of discretion results when the judge 'fails to consider all 
legally relevant factors' or if the sentence imposed is 'clearly excessive.'" State v. McCovey, 
803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted). 
2. Did the trial court err by imposing unauthorized three-year firearm 
enhancements? 
"When the pertinent facts are undisputed," the legality of a sentence presents "a purely 
legal question with respect to which the trial court has no discretion." State v. Brooks, 908 
P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Resolution of this case requires application of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1995) and 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (1995), both reproduced in addendum A. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By second amended information dated 3 April 1995, defendant was charged as 
follows: 
Count I Aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995); 
Count II Aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995); 
Count III Aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995); 
Count IV Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory 
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995); 
Count V Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory 
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995); 
Count VI Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory 
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995); 
Count VII Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory 
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995); 
Count VIII Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory 
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995); 
Count IX Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory 
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995); 
Count X Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with ininimum mandatory 
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995); 
Count XI Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony witii minimum mandatory 
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995); 
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Count XII Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory 
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995); 
Count XIII Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory 
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995); 
Count XIV Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory 
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995); 
Count XV Aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony with minimum mandatory 
sentences, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995); 
Count XVI Possession of a dangerous weapon by restricted person, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1995). 
(R. 18-25, addendum B). All counts except XVI carried firearms enhancements (id.). 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State dismissed the following ten counts: 
Count I Aggravated assault; 
Count IV Aggravated kidnaping; 
Count V Aggravated kidnaping; 
Count IX Aggravated kidnaping; 
Count XI Aggravated kidnaping; 
Count XII Aggravated kidnaping; 
Count XIII Aggravated kidnaping; 
Count XIV Aggravated kidnaping; 
Count XV Aggravated kidnaping; 
Count XVI Possession of a dangerous weapon by restricted person. 
(R. 168). The aggravated kidnaping charges carried minimum mandatory terms. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-302(3) (1995). The State also reduced counts VII, VIII, and X from 
aggravated kidnaping to kidnaping (compare R. 20-21 with 168). Finally, the State dismissed 
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unrelated charges of aggravated robbery and possession of a weapon by a restricted person 
stemming from a reported carjacking in which defendant was the gunman (R. 249-50, 8a). 
Defendant pled guilty to the following six counts: 
Counts II Aggravated robbery; 
Count III Aggravated robbery; 
Count VI Attempted aggravated kidnaping; 
Count VII Kidnaping; 
Count VIII Kidnaping; 
Count X Kidnaping. 
(R. 167-68 [addendum C], 272-73, 280). None carried minimum mandatory terms. 
Defendant was sentenced to statutory prison terms as follows: on each of the three first 
degree felonies, for five years to life plus a 3-year weapons enhancement; on each of the 
three second degree felonies, for one to fifteen years (R. 181-89, addendum D). All sentences 
were run consecutively (id.). Fines, surcharges, and restitution were also imposed (R. 181). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 197). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Crime1 
By the time he was 22 years old, defendant had a "history of aggressive, criminal behavior 
with the gang culture" (R. 16a). In fact, he was a "known, established leader" of the Varrio 
1
 Except as otherwise noted, this recitation of the facts is based on the factual basis 
proffered by the prosecutor at the change of plea hearing, the Presentence Investigative 
Report, and witness statements and the report of a defense psychologist annexed to that 
report. 
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Loco Town gang (R. 25a). So when Officer Matthew Jewkes saw defendant drive past on 
State Street in South Salt Lake, Jewkes wondered why defendant was not in jail or custody 
(R. 258). Jewkes and defendant had met in the Utah State Prison, where Jewkes had been 
a guard and defendant an inmate (R. 258, 2a). Jewkes followed defendant, visited with 
him, and, after they parted company, performed a warrants check. The check disclosed 
an outstanding $10,000 warrant for defendant's arrest (R. 2a). 
Officer Jewkes later spotted defendant sitting on the steps of the Ritz bowling alley 
(R. 3a). He approached defendant and said that he wanted to talk to him, to which defendant 
replied, "fuck you" and started to run away (id.). Jewkes followed him and a struggled 
ensued (id.). Defendant overpowered Jewkes and, after a "very violent struggle . . . for 
several minutes" defendant succeeded in taking the officer's 9 mm semi-automatic pistol 
(id., 16a). He pointed the gun at Jewkes' chest and head while demanding his radio (R. 
3a). Defendant took the radio and ran to a nearby Wendy's restaurant (id.). 
Defendant approached the car at the drive-through window, put the pistol to the driver's 
face, and said, "let me in your car" (R. 50a, 53a). He pounded on her window, but she 
locked her doors and rolled her windows half way up (R. 51a). When the girl at the window 
told him to move, he turned around and pointed the gun at her (R. 52a). At that moment 
another officer came around the corner and defendant ran away without responding to the 
officer's order to drop the weapon (R. 3a). 
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Defendant ran to a nearby Taco Bell restaurant (R. 4a). He walked in the door, demanded 
that everybody lie down on the floor and the doors be locked, and drew the gun (R. 57a). 
Defendant ordered one of the hostages to try to reach defendant's girlfriend Jennifer by phone 
(R. 59a). When he could not talk to Jennifer, defendant angrily fired a shot at the ceiling 
(R. 60a). He told a police officer on the phone that "if he didn't get Jennifer inside the 
store that he was going to shoot himself and everybody else" (R. 61a, 58a). 
Defendant grabbed a female Taco Bell employee by the neck and pointed the gun at 
her head (R. 4a, 60a). He "draggfed] her around" while trying to get all the employees 
and customers to the floor (id.). She was "very scared" (R. 76a). Later he had the victims 
form a circle around him "so that the officers outside the window could see that if he shot 
himself he was going to take other people with him in the process" (R. 61a). He also had 
two men sit on the counter to shield him from any police fire from outside the restaurant 
(R. 68a). Then defendant fired a second shot through a window (R. 61a-62a, 4a).2 
Several hostages were able to escape while defendant's attention was elsewhere (R. 
4a). Several others went to the back door to shut it on defendant's orders; police urged 
them to leave the building, but some refused, one stating that defendant had threatened to 
"start killing people if she did not come back" (R. 4a). Nevertheless, police pulled three 
hostages to safety from the back door (id.). 
2
 The court found that these shots were intentional and not accidental as defendant 
claimed (R. 323). 
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Police negotiated with defendant by telephone. After defendant was allowed to speak 
to his mother and girlfriend by telephone and observe them from a distance, he agreed to 
release the remaining hostages and surrendered to police (R. 4a). 
Fifteen victims were involved in the incident, 12 of whom were held hostage inside 
the Taco Bell for approximately three hours (R. 4a, 150a). 
Sentencing Considerations 
AP&P victim impact statements. Defendant's crimes have had serious impact on 
many of his victims. One reports that the crime "dramatically impacted her life in a manner 
that only time will help heal" (R. 10a). She feels paranoid and anxious when getting into 
her car in parking lots and fears being car jacked (id.). Another reports feeling "mentally 
scarred" and suffering ongoing nightmares and fear of retaliation (R. 1 la). Another writes 
that "the fear of [defendant] on the street haunts me" (R. 12a). Another states that "she 
had difficulty believing what was happening and when she wanted to runaway [sic] her feet 
felt very soft as if they wouldn't work properly when she tried to run" (R. 15a). 
Defendant's family background. Defendant was born and raised in Salt Lake City, 
the oldest of three children (R. 23a). His parents divorced when he was 12 years old (R. 
23a). Defendant was raised in a lower socio-economic environment with alcoholism and 
criminal activity on both sides of his extended family (id.). "His upbringing was turbulent 
at best, having been exposed to both physical and verbal abuse by his father and surrounded 
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by influences in which retaliation, substance abuse, and criminal activity were recurring 
themes" (R. 30a). 
Defendant told defense psychologist Vicki Gregory that he began smoking marijuana 
at age 8 or 9, abusing inhalants between the ages of 10 and 13, drinking alcohol at age 12, 
and using cocaine at age 16 (R. 107a). 
Juvenile record. Defendant's juvenile record began in 1984, when he was 12 (R. 17a). 
It features 29 referrals, including shoplifting, habitual truancy, destruction of property (nine 
charges), aggravated assault, receiving stolen property, burglary, and theft (R. 17a-19a). 
He was placed into "an intense supervision program designed for hardcore, repeat youth 
offenders" (R. 21a). 
Adult record. Defendant's adult record prior to the instant crime, spanning from June 
1990 to September 1994, includes assault (guilty plea), vandalism (dismissed per plea bargain), 
disturbing the peace (guilty plea), vehicle burglary, theft by receiving stolen property (pled 
guilty to lesser offense), battery (served jail time), aggravated robbery (pled guilty to attempted 
robbery, a third degree felony), possession of stolen property, interfering with arrest, giving 
false information, parole violations, burglary, possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person, supplying alcohol to a minor, and possession of a controlled substance (R. 19a-20a). 
In March of 1991 defendant was sentenced to 0 to 5 years after pleading guilty to robbery, 
a third degree felony (R. 22a). Paroled in May of 1992, defendant was arrested three months 
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later for possession of a stolen firearm, consuming alcohol by a minor, interfering in an 
arrest, and providing false information (id.). His parole was revoked (id.). 
In August 1993 defendant was granted a second parole (id.). He was placed in a halfway 
house on condition that he remain there until stabilized, complete the parol program, submit 
to drug testing, complete mental health and substance abuse counseling, and refrain from 
drug and alcohol use (id.). Thirteen days later defendant absconded. He was later arrested 
and his parole revoked (id.). 
In January of 1994 defendant was granted a third parole (R. 22a). His parole was adjudged 
"substandard" because he failed to secure employment or participate in counseling as ordered, 
but he did participate in gang education and awareness talks in the community (R. 23a). 
His parole w&s terminated early, at which time his supervising agent wrote, "if Mr. Montoya 
should come into the criminal system again in the future he should not be cut any slack due 
to the fact he should know better because of his already having been in the probation and 
parole system previously" (id.) 
Gang affiliations. The bulk of defendant's criminal acts were "committed as an active 
gang member, many with other gang members taking part" (R. 24a). He is a "known, 
established leader" of the Varrio Loco Town (" VLT") gang, using the monikers "Sir Gino" 
and "Sir Ray" (R. 25a). The gang is multi-generational, and was originally called "Montoyas 
with Attitude" (id.). 
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Before the present offense defendant showed some involvement in speaking out against 
gangs, "but at the same time there was evidence within the gang unit the defendant was 
still an active leader within VLT" (id.). Contrary to defendant's view, police concluded 
that he "has had a negative, rather than positive impact upon younger gang members" (id.). 
Mental health. Defendant "grew up in an anti-social environment and is very assaultive 
as a result" (R. 26a). Coupled with his "difficulty in thinking and concentrating," defendant 
shows "resentfulness, hostility, and aggressiveness" (id.). "His judgment is impaired and 
he fails to profit from experience" (id.). Words used by mental health professionals to describe 
defendant include anxious, pessimistic, apathetic, emotionally inhibited, maladaptive under 
stress, argumentative, sarcastic, self-indulgent, shrewd, and deceitful (id.). But "no evidence 
of serious mental illness has ever been discovered" (id.). 
Defendant functions "within the dull to normal range of intellectual ability with an IQ 
score of 81" (R. 26a). His performance on psychological tests administered by defense 
psychologist Vicki Gregory involving word recognition, reading, and passage comprehension 
are "consistent with a second grade level" (R. 110a). 
Rehabilitation. While defense psychologist Vicki Gregory is optimistic that defendant 
"has a substantial interest in making changes in his life and appears motivated for treatment," 
she concedes that "the combination of problems tiiat he is reporting suggests that treatment 
is likely to be quite challenging," that defendant's "cognitive deficits will also make treatment 
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difficult," and that defendant "lacks the verbal, language, and reading ability to benefit from 
traditional insight-oriented therapy" (R. 116a). 
In fact, the primary obstacle to progress appears to be defendant's lack of desire: "many 
of the defendant's problems could be lessened if not eliminated were he able to withdraw 
himself from his gang lifestyle and put forth a modicum of effort. Unfortunately, the defendant 
has proven unwilling to make any such long term effort to date" (R. 26a). 
The presentence report notes, "Because of his penchant for violence and aggressive 
behavior the defendant had been referred for mental health counseling previously while under 
supervision with Adult Probation and Parole but his attendance was lacking and no significant 
progress was ever made" (R. 26a). His parole officer noted that defendant "failed to respond 
genuinely" (R. 28a). 
The presentence report concludes that although defendant "can articulate a commitment 
to ending his involvement in the gang lifestyle and all its consequences he has never been 
able to substantiate his reported commitment with sustained change" (R. 3la). It continues, 
"Intervention has been attempted on the defendant's behalf in the juvenile system and early 
in adulthood but he fails to respond" (id.). 
Recommendations. Defense counsel conceded that defendant's history and crimes 
"may warrant incarceration as a punitive sanction but she requested the terms run concurrendy". 
in view of the fact that the crimes arise out of a single episode (R. 28a). 
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The prosecutor recommended that all counts run consecutively (id.). The Salt Lake 
Metro Gang Unit recommended "extended incarceration" (R. 25a). 
Defendant's last supervising parole officer, Stuart Mclver, stated that defendant "was 
given every opportunity, more than others, to succeed but failed to respond genuinely" (R. 
28a). "When working one on one," he continued, "the defendant was compliant and receptive 
to change but when he would be in his own surroundings with friends and family he was 
a major concern and unable to follow through to any great degree" (id.); compare Br. of 
Aplt. at 14, 15 (quoting only the words "compliant" and "receptive"). 
Defendant's grandmother insisted he has a "good heart," cf. Br. of Aplt. at 15 (quoting 
words without attribution), but "a child's mind" (R. 29a). She reiterated her desire for him 
to get help (id.). Defendant's mother's "primary concern" was that defendant not be housed 
at the Utah State Prison, where his father and numerous cousins are incarcerated (R. 137a). 
Defendant's former girlfriend described him as a "pretty good guy" and stated that 
he was "scared of going back to prison and didn't know what to do" (R. 29a). 
AP&P recommendation. The presentence report states, "In consideration of all factors 
it is the consensus of Adult Probation and Parole [that] the defendant receive a lengthy period 
of incarceration and [that he] is not deserving of the minimum term which would result if 
all counts are applied concurrently. The community demands and the defendant's pattern 
of aggressive criminal behavior justifies substantial consequences" (R. 31a). 
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Accordingly, AP&P "recommended the three applicable firearm enhancements be applied 
fully and that all counts run consecutive" (R. 32a). 
Sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel made two major points. 
First, she urged the court to sentence defendant to concurrent rather than consecutive sentences 
(R. 299-300). She recognized that a prison term was to be expected (R. 297, 299). She 
also conceded that much of the presentence information indicated that defendant was "hopeless" 
and "what we should do is simply put him away forever" (R. 297). However, she relied 
on statements from defendant's girlfriend, his mother, and from other individuals "that indicate 
there is something within Gino that's worth considering" (R. 297-98). 
She argued that defendant was "not a depraved, spiteful, hurtful individual who chooses 
to prey upon the rest of us," as witnessed by the fact that he did not kill or physically injure 
the hostages or other victims (R. 298-99). Counsel argued that by imposing concurrent 
sentences the court would be "at least acknowledging the possibilities for this young man 
to try to put it together" (R. 303, 300). Counsel mentioned defendant's "long history of 
. . . learning disabilities" and that defendant "cannot read, he cannot write" and that he 
"functions at a second grade level educationally" (R. 297, 303). 
Second, defense counsel urged the court to recommend to the Board of Pardons that 
they allow defendant to transfer out of the Utah State Prison, where his father and other 
family members are housed, and be held out of state (R. 304). 
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Defendant's mother spoke on his behalf, stating that defendant would never hurt his 
victims, "so they shouldn't even be afraid any more, because he would have done it a long 
time ago" (R. 306). 
The District Attorney personally appeared and spoke in favor of consecutive sentences, 
wondering rhetorically "how many times Mr. Montoya has heard these same admonitions, 
how many times has counsel represented the same thing on different events, how many times 
has he had the opportunity to be presented with facts and how many times has he said, I'll 
straighten up" (R. 309). He also noted that defendant's actual incarceration time would 
be determined by the Board of Pardons, whether the sentences ran concurrently or consecutively 
(R. 312). 
Two victims spoke. The first described herself as "okay" but traumatized. She continued: 
"I go to work every day and it's like it reoccurs every day you walk in. I have a hard time 
going out into my lobby every day . . . My establishment has still got us with a counselor. 
It's still affecting my family life, my family, my kids" (R. 313-14). She also reported attempts 
on her life: "Since he pleaded guilty in July, your Honor, I have had four attempts on my 
life through my store that his gang has come in. They have now taken me out of my own 
store for my protection. And basically I can't live this way" (R. 314). She reported "having 
nightmares night after night after night" (R. 314). 
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The second victim reported that she cannot go to Taco Bell or out on the streets after 
dark, that she goes nowhere alone, that she cannot even drive herself places, that she cannot 
sleep at night, and that she "still wake[s] up screaming" (R. 316). "But right now that's 
not my worry," she continued; she worries more "because of his friends and family that 
come in and threaten us at work" (R. 316-17). 
Prior to pronouncing sentence, the court reviewed the facts of the case in detail (R. 
322-27). It noted that defendant had "been shown leniency in this case by virtue of the plea" 
bargain (R. 327), through which all charges carrying minimum mandatory sentences were 
dismissed or reduced. With respect to the issue of consecutive sentences, the court stated: 
"It appears to the Court that, in view of the past unsuccessful attempts at rehabilitation and 
supervision and probation and parole, and in light of all the other circumstances presented 
to the Court, that it is just that those sentences all be consecutive to one another" (R. 328-29). 
The court also stated that it would recommend to the Board of Pardons that, "if Mr. 
Montoya is to have any chance of succeeding and actually changing his life," he would need 
to be assigned to an alternative facility, not the Utah State Prison (R. 332). 
The court asked counsel three times whether it had overlooked anything in sentencing 
defendant (R. 330,331,333). Defense counsel never asserted that the court had inadequately 
considered defendant's rehabilitative needs or otherwise abused its discretion (id.). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant was charged with crimes carrying potential minimum mandatory sentences, 
with firearm enhancements, of 192 years if run consecutively. In the plea bargain, the State 
dismissed or reduced all charges carrying minimum mandatory terms. As a result, defendant 
received three sentences of five to life and three sentences of one to fifteen years, all running 
consecutively. He argues that the court abused its discretion in not running the sentences 
concurrently. 
The court properly considered all factors, including defendant's purported "rehabilitative 
needs." Defendant has a long history of gang-related violent crime. All previous attempts 
at rehabilitation have failed as a result of his lack of effort. Even the defense psychologist 
conceded that rehabilitation would be difficult. 
The two cases upon which defendant relies, State v. Strunk and State v. Smith, are 
inapposite. Those cases involved consecutive minimum mandatory terms of 24 years and 
60 years respectively, depriving the Board of Pardons of any discretion to release Strunk 
or Smith earlier. Here, by contrast, the Board of Pardons has complete discretion over the 
actual length of defendant's incarceration. The court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel 
all recognized this fact at sentencing. 
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2. The court improperly imposed unauthorized three-year determinate firearm 
enhancements on the three first-degree felony convictions. This Court should remand with 
directions to correct this inadvertent error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
WHERE THE STATE DISMISSED TEN COUNTS, AND DISMISSED 
OR REDUCED ALL CHARGES CARRYING MINIMUM 
MANDATORY TERMS, THE TRIAL COURT REASONABLY 
IMPOSED CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES ON THE REMAINING SLX 
CHARGES AS RECOMMENDED BY AP&P 
Defendant claims that the sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing 
consecutive sentences without adequately considering defendant's rehabilitative 
"needs." Br. of Aplt. at 16-17. 
Defendant's potential mandatory sentence: 192 years. As a result of the plea 
bargain, all charges carrying minimum mandatory terms were dismissed or reduced (R. 
168). The prosecutor stated in chambers prior to the guilty plea that he was willing to 
enter diis plea bargain because he "felt that with the six offenses to which Mr. Montoya 
[was] pleading guilty, together with the firearms enhancements on die three First 
Degree Felonies, . . . that there would not be a substantial difference of a possibility in 
the amount of time he would be doing" (R. 250). 
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Defendant was charged with twelve first degree felonies carrying minimum 
mandatory terms of 5, 10, or 15 years (R. 18-25, addendum B). Conviction on these 
charges would have resulted in aggregate minimum mandatory terms of 60, 120, or 180 
years. Mandatory firearm enhancements would have added at least 12 consecutive 
mandatory years, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) & (2) (1995), resulting in possible 
consecutive sentences of between 72 and 192 years without possibility of parole. 
At stake on appeal: 5 years. The difference between defendant's likely prison 
time under consecutive and concurrent sentences here is not huge: probably less than 
five years. 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel reported her calculations of the likely 
prison terms defendant would serve under concurrent sentences and under consecutive 
sentences, based on AP&P's matrix (R. 300-01, 34a, addendum E). She correctly 
calculated the predicted minimum term, without firearm enhancements, of 19^ 2 years 
(10 years plus 114 months) if defendant were sentenced consecutively (R. 330-01, 34a, 
addendum E). For concurrent sentences, the matrix predicts a prison term of 14 years 
nine months (10 years plus 57 months) (see R. 34a, addendum E). This amounts to a 
reduction of 57 months, or less than five years.3 Thus, as defense counsel accurately 
3
 The time attributable to two of the three first degree felonies would be reduced by 
30 months (15 months each) and the time attributable to the three second degree 
felonies would be reduced by 27 months (nine months each). 
19 
noted at sentencing, "There is very little difference in many respects between the 
consecutive and concurrent sentencing here" (R. 300). 
Standard of review. A reviewing court will "not disturb a sentence unless it 
exceeds that prescribed by law or unless the trial court has abused its discretion." State 
v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986); State v. Russell 791 P.2d 188, 192-93 
(Utah 1990); State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1978). "An abuse of 
discretion results when the judge 'fails to consider all legally relevant factors' or if the 
sentence imposed is 'clearly excessive.'" State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 
1990) (citations omitted). 
Sentencing considerations. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (l)-(3) (1995) controls 
the imposition of consecutive sentences. It provides: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of 
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently 
unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in 
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of 
a single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
The court here clearly considered "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant" as required by this 
statute. Defendant concedes that uthe gravity and circumstances of this case arguably 
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weigh against concurrent sentences," although defendant would accord "minimal" 
weight to this factor. Br. of Aplt. at 24. Defendant further concedes that "the trial 
court for the most part acted within proper bounds in assessing Montoya's history and 
character." Id. at 25. 
With respect to defendant's rehabilitative needs, however, defendant asserts that 
the sentencing court "failed to properly consider that factor." Id. He claims that he has 
"special needs due to his learning and cognitive impairments . . . and is amenable to 
treatment even though such a process might be difficult." Id. at 28. 
The record is clear that defendant suffers from severe learning and cognitive 
deficits. What is unclear is how that fact supports concurrent sentences. Defendant's 
learning needs might be relevant if he had identified a particular program that could 
address his mental impairments better than prison, but he has not done so. On the 
contrary, defense counsel conceded that the decision before the court was not whether 
to place defendant in prison or elsewhere, but how long to imprison him (R. 28a). 
Defendant's learning and cognitive deficits might weigh in favor of a shorter 
rather than a longer prison term if they were likely to speed rehabilitation, but again, 
just the reverse is true. The defense psychologist wrote, "His cognitive deficits will 
also make treatment difficult. Mr. Montoya lacks the verbal, language, and reading 
ability to benefit from traditional insight-oriented therapy" (R. 116a). 
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As for defendant's purported amenability to treatment, that claim rests primarily 
upon his own self-serving statements to the defense psychologist, who found him 
"motivated for treatment" (R. 116a). But even the defense psychologist, likely to offer 
the rosiest possible prognosis, conceded that treatment was likely to be "quite 
challenging" and "difficult" (R. 116a). 
The sentencing court appeared to be more impressed with defendant's actual 
history of rehabilitative efforts, which consists of a string of failures. The presentence 
report concluded that although defendant can verbally commit to turn his life around, 
"he has never been able to substantiate his reported commitment with sustained 
change" (R. 31a). Prior attempts at mental health counseling under APifeP supervision 
failed due to defendant's lack of attendance, with the result that "no significant progress 
was ever made" (R. 26a). Defendant "failed to respond genuinely" (R. 28a) and "fails 
to profit from experience" (R. 26a). 
Defendant sees hope for rehabilitation in the belief that "[p]eople who have gotten 
close to [defendant] have positive feelings about him and describe him as having a 
'good heart.' R. 29a, 93a, 318-20." Br. of Aplt. at 27-28. The "good heart" 
comment was made by only one person, defendant's grandmother {see R. 29a). R. 
318-20 refers to a statement made at sentencing by Mark Montoya, defendant's ex-
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girlfriend's father (R. 318). He described defendant as "a pretty good guy" and "not 
bad. He really is a caring person. He could be" (R. 319-20, emphasis added).4 
In contrast, mental health professionals who have gotten close to defendant 
describe him as resentful, hostile, aggressive, pessimistic, apathetic, emotionally 
inhibited, maladaptive under stress, argumentative, sarcastic, self-indulgent, shrewd, 
and deceitful (R. 26a). 
The court adequately considered and weighed all factors. 
Case law. The only cases cited in Point I of defendant's brief are State v. Smith, 
909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995), and State v. StrunK 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993). However, 
none of the factors informing these cases are present here. 
Smith was convicted of aggravated kidnaping, rape of a child, and two counts of 
sodomy on a child, all first degree felonies. Smith, 909 P.2d at 238. The sentencing 
court stacked four 15-year minimum mandatory terms, resulting in a sixty-year 
sentence without possibility of parole. Id. at 244. In a ruling "limited to the facts of 
this case," the Utah Supreme Court held "it unreasonable and an abuse of discretion to 
have imposed essentially a minimum mandatory life sentence and thereby deprive the 
Board of Pardons of discretion to take into account defendant's future conduct and 
possible progress toward rehabilitation." Id. at 245. 
4
 The remaining record page cited by defendant, R. 93a, was apparently cited in 
error, as it does not pertain to this issue. 
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In contrast, defendant here plea bargained away his minimum mandatory sentences 
and may be paroled whenever the Board of Pardons, in its discretion, determines 
appropriate. Defense counsel recognized this {see R. 302) ("Gino's life is going to be 
determined through the control of the Board of Pardons and others"); the prosecutor 
recognized this {see R. 312) ("the Board could keep him forever" or they could "kick 
him up after five years"); and the sentencing court recognized it {see R. 328) (life 
sentence "only possible if the Board of Pardons determines that that is appropriate").5 
Moreover, the difference between consecutive and concurrent sentences in Smith was 
45 years; here the predicted difference is under five years. 
Strunk pled guilty to first degree murder, child kidnaping, and aggravated sexual 
abuse of a child. Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1299. He was 16 years old at the time of the 
offense. Id. He received a life sentence on the first degree murder, and consecutive 
minimum mandatory sentences of 15 years for the child kidnaping and nine years for 
the aggravated sexual assault of a child. Id. at 1299, 1301. The court remanded the 
case because "the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sufficiently consider 
5
 The court and counsel were legally correct. "Under Utah's sentencing scheme, 
'the trial judge has no discretion in fixing the term of imprisonment. He or she simply 
imposes the statutorily prescribed range of years, and the Board of Pardons determines 
exactly how long the prisoner is to be confined.'" Rowlings v. Holden, 869 P.2d 958, 
960 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Labrum v. Utah Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 907 
(Utah 1993)) (in turn quoting State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 563 (Utah 1987) 
(Zimmerman, J., dissenting))). 
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defendant's rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme youth and the absence of prior 
violent crimes." Id. at 1302. 
The court went on to address Strunk's sentence. "By ordering Strunk's minimum 
sentences . . . to run consecutive to each other, the trial court assured that Strunk 
would spend a minimum of twenty-four years in prison before being eligible for 
parole." Id. at 1301. The Court noted, "While imprisonment for that period of time, 
or even longer, may prove to be necessary and appropriate, the twenty-four-year term 
robs the Board of Pardons of any flexibility to parole Strunk sooner." Id. 
Accordingly, the court directed that "if on remand the trial court again imposes the 
longest minimum mandatory terms for these two offenses, all three terms should be 
ordered to run concurrently to afford the Board of Pardons the flexibility to adjust 
Strunk's prison stay to match his progress in rehabilitation and preparation to return to 
society." Id. at 1302. 
The controlling factors in Strunk were Strunk's "extreme youth," the "absence of 
prior violent crimes," and the 24-year minimum mandatory sentence. None are present 
here: defendant was a 22-year-old adult at the time of the crime; had a "history of 
aggressive, criminal behavior with the gang culture"; and plea-bargained away all 
minimum mandatory sentences (R. la-2a, 16a, 168). 
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Strunk and Smith are best understood as departures from the general rule that 
consecutive sentences are within the trial court's discretion. See Smith, 909 P.2d at 
245 ("We do not mean to imply by this ruling that consecutive sentences are never 
appropriate."); State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986) ("Having determined 
that the consecutive sentences are statutorily permissible, we find no abuse of discretion 
by the trial court in their imposition in this case."). This is so where the terms are 
mandatory, see State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993) (upholding seventy-five years 
of consecutive terms, including two minimum mandatory terms of fifteen years to life); 
State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) (upholding two consecutive nine-
year minimum mandatory sentences), and where they arise out of the same criminal 
episode. State v. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136, 1140 (Utah App. 1991); State v. O'Brien, 
111 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1986). 
* * * 
By any measure, defendant's sentence is reasonable. It is reasonable compared to 
the sentences facing defendant under the amended information. It is reasonable in view 
of defendant's history of gang violence and unwillingness to rehabilitate. It is 
reasonable in view of the harm suffered by defendant's many victims and defendant's 
future dangerousness. Consecutive sentences were recommended by Adult Probation 
and Parole and, indeed, by everyone except defendant's counsel and his mother. The 
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court did not abuse its discretion, but acted within the "limits of reasonableness," State 
v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992), in imposing consecutive prison terms. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING UNAUTHORIZED 
THREE-YEAR FIREARM ENHANCEMENTS 
This Court should correct what appears to be an inadvertent error made by the trial 
court in imposing firearm enhancements. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (1995), if the trier of fact finds a dangerous weapon 
was used in the commission of a first-degree felony, "the court shall additionally sentence 
the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently." 
If a firearm is used, an enhancement of at least one year must be imposed: aa mandatory 
one-year minimum enhancement sentence must be imposed for use of a firearm in cases 
involving first and second degree felonies." State v. Willett, 694 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1984). 
However, the court's discretion is limited: "the statute requires that the trial court choose 
between a determinate one-year sentence or an indeterminate sentence of one to five years." 
State v. Beltran-Felix, No. 950341-CA, slip op. at 14 (Utah App. July 5, 1996); State v. 
Cobb, 11A P.2d 1123, 1129 (Utah 1989). 
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Here, defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of 
attempted aggravated kidnaping, all first degree felonies (R. 181-86, addendum D). He 
used a firearm in committing these crimes (R. 258-59). On each count, the court properly 
imposed a firearm enhancement, but erroneously specified a determinate term of three years 
{see R. 182, 184, 186, addendum D). 
This Court "may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, 
at any time," Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1995), 
even if the sentence is "unlawfully lenient." State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991), 
cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 883 (1992). It should do so here, remanding with directions to 
impose a firearm enhancement of either a determinate term of one year or an indeterminate 
term of "more than one year but not more than five years," Willett, 694 P.2d at 603, on 
the three first-degree felony counts. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's consecutive sentences should be affirmed; the case should be remanded 
to the district court for correction of the unauthorized firearm enhancements on the three 
first-degree felony counts. 
ORAL ARGUMENT and PUBLISHED OPINION 
Oral argument would not significandy aid the decisional process in this case. The first 
issue on appeal borders on frivolous, and the second is undisputed. A published opinion 
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is desirable, but would contribute incrementally rather than substantially to the body of Utah 
case law. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1995). Concurrent or consecutive sentences - Limitations. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the court states in the sentence 
that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose 
consecutive sentences. 
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(4) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences 
imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment. However, this limitation does not apply 
if an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a maximum 
sentence of life imprisonment. 
(5) The limitation in Subsection (4) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were 
committed prior to imposition of sentence for any one or more of them; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing 
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction. 
(6) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they 
shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has 
been committed for a single term that shall consist of the aggregate of the validly imposed 
prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(7) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with 
the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser sentence shall merge into 
the greater and the greater shall be the term to be served. If the sentences are equal and 
concurrent, they shall merge into one sentence with the most recent conviction constituting 
the time to be served. 
(8) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so imposed, 
but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments. 
(9) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (1995). Felony conviction - Indeterminate term of 
imprisonment - Increase of sentence if dangerous weapon used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than five years, 
unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may be for life but if the trier 
of fact finds a dangerous weapon or a facsimile or the representation of a dangerous 
weapon, as provided in Section 76-1-601, was used in the commission or furtherance 
of the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of 
one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally 
sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to 
run consecutively and not concurrently. 
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Case No. 951002280FS 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
The undersigned Roger S. Blaylock - Deputy District Attorney, under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant, committed the crimes of: 
COUNTI 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, at 146 East Wentworth , in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 103, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, assaulted Matthew Jewkes, by the use of a 
dangerous weapon, to-wit: a gun; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or 
the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Assault, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; 
COUNT II 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 146 East Wentworth, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal 
property in the possession of Matthew Jewkes from the person or immediate presence of 
Matthew Jewkes, and in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use 
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of a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a gun and/or caused serious bodily injury to Matthew 
Jewkes; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or the representation of a 
firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated Robbery, giving 
rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended 
COUNT III 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 2185 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
. County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
A ^ \ Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
^
v
 JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal 
7 property in the possession of Jennifer Hansen from the person or immediate presence of 
Jennifer Hansen, and in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use „ 
of a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a gun and/or caused serious bodily injury to Jennifer 
Hansen; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or the representation of a 
firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated Robbery, giving 
rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. 
COUNT IV 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without 
authority of law, and against the will of Edward Johnson, seize, with the intent use as a 
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony; or with the intent to inflict bodily injury 
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; 
COUNTV 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without 
authority of law, and against the will of Robert Crites, seize, with the intent use as a 
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted 
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i#i 
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury 
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; 
U^OUNTVI 
^AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
* \ V \ JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without 
A ) authority of law, and against the will of Glenda Fullmer, seize, with the intent use as a 
(o* hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony; or with the intent to inflict bodily injury 
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; 
COUNT VII 
AGQRAVAiED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without 
authority of law, and against the will of Angela Hendrickson, seize, with the intent use as 
a hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury 
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; 
COUNT VIII 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
c \ \ A X JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without 
t /^ — authority of law, and against the will of Troy Davis, seize, with the intent use as a 
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commission of a felony, or flight from a felony; or with the intent to inflict bodily injury 
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; 
COUNT IX 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without 
authority of law, and against the will of Todd Ellis, seize, with the intent to use as a 
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury 
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; 
AMENDED INFORMATION 
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AOQRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
\VAX Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
( v ) JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without 
NT authority of law, and against the will of Tim Bohlen, seize, with the intent to use as a 
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury 
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; 
COUNT XI 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without 
authority of law, and against the will of Ebelio Mares, seize, with the intent to use as a 
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury 
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; 
COUNT XII 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3,1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without 
authority of law, and against the will of Cheryl Tucker, seize, with the intent to use as a 
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury 
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; 
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COUNT XIII 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without 
authority of law, and against the will of Jolene Jackson, seize, with the intent to use as a 
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury 
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; 
COUNT XIV 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without 
authority of law, and against the will of Arturo Mares, seize, with the intent to use as a 
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury 
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; 
COUNT XV 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and without 
authority of law, and against the will of Patsy Bendixen, seize, with the intent to use as a 
hostage or shield; or with the intent to facilitate the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony, or flight from a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury 
on or to terrorize the victim of another; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Kidnapping, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; 
AMENDED INFORMATION 
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COUNT XVI 
POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY RESTRICTED PERSON, a Second Degree 
Felony, at 2161 South State Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about 
February 3,1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 503, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO JOSEPH MONTOYA, a party to the 
offense, did have in his possession a dangerous weapon, to-wit: firearm while on parole 
or probation for a felony. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Michael Fierro, Gregg Carlson, Matthew Jewkes, Mike McNaughton, Mike Hoffman, 
Patrick J. Kryger, Janaye A. Johnson, Edward Johnson, Robert Crites, Glenda Fullmer, 
Angela Hendrickson, Troy Davis, Todd Ellis, Tim Bohlen, Karen Roberts, Elesa Capulin, 
Ebelio Mares, Cheryl Tucker, Jolene Jackson, Arturo Mares, Elionso Mares, Patsy 
Bendixen, Jennifer Hansen, Steven Mallett and Steve Daniels. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant, a South Salt Lake City Police detective, bases this information on their 
reports, Case No. 95-20134, which he has read, and his personal investigation, which disclosed 
the following: 
1. The report of Officer Matthew Jewkes of the South Salt Lake City Police 
Department to the effect that on February 3,1995, at 146 East Wentworth, South Salt Lake City, 
Utah, upon taking the defendant into custody on an arrest for outstanding warrants, the defendant 
engaged Officer Jewkes in a violent struggle and overpowered him. The defendant managed to 
gain control of Officer Jewkes' Glock 9mm semiautomatic pistol and held it to Officer Jewkes' 
chest then to his head and demanded that Officer Jewkes' give him his police radio. The 
defendant then fled. 
2. The oral and written statements of Ms. Jennifer Hansen to the effect that on 
February 3, 1995, while she was at the drive-up window at the Wendy's restaurant located at 
2185 South State Street, South Salt Lake City, Utah, the defendant approached with a gun and a 
hand-held radio in his hands and pointed the gun at Ms. Hansen and said, "Get out of the car!" 
twice. At that time a police officer (Mike McNaughton) approached, and the defendant fled. 
AMENDED INFORMATION 
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3. The report of Officer McNaughton of the South Salt Lake City Police Department 
to the effect that on February 3,1995, at the above-described Wendy's restaurant, he observed the 
defendant at Ms. Hansen's automobile pointing the gun at her, and when he gave chase, the 
defendant fled to the Taco Bell restaurant located at 2161 South State Street, South Salt Lake 
City, where he entered and took hostage at gun point fifteen customers and employees for a 
period of two and a half hours. 
4. The oral and written statements of fifteen customers and employees of the above-
mentioned Taco Bell restaurant, to the effect that the defendant entered the restaurant, told them 
to get on the floor and that, during the course of the hostage situation, he threatened that he was 
going to kill all fifteen people and himself. Twice during the situation, the defendant fired the 
gun. 
5. A review of the defendant's Utah Criminal History discloses that he has formerly 
been convicted of the crime of Attempted Robbery, a cprfje of violence, in the Utah Third 
District Court. 
ROGEK S. BLAYLOCK 
ibscribed and sworn to before me this ^ 
'day of April, 1995. 
r * 
MAGISTRATE 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 





IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GINO JOSEPH MONTOYA, 
Defendant. 
(Jail) 
MINUTE ENTRY - NOTICE 
Date: JULY 12, 1995 
Case No: 951900533 FS 
Judge: ANNE M. STIRBA 
Clerk: MRT 
Reporter: SUZANNE WARNICK 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
This case is before the court for CHANGE OF PLEA on the charges 
of 
(1) AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
(2) AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
(3) AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
(4) AGG KIDNAPPING 
(5) AGG KIDNAPPING 
(6) AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
(7) AGG KIDNAPPING 
(8) AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
(9) AGG KIDNAPPING 
(10) AGG KIDNAPPING 
(11) AGG KIDNAPPING 
(12) AGG KIDNAPPING 
(13) AGG KIDNAPPING 
(14) AGG KIDNAPPING 
(15) AGG KIDNAPPING 
(16) POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON 
(Third Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
Appearing for the State is ROGER BLAYLOCK. Appearing as counsel 
for the defendant is CANDICE A JOHNSON. 
The court grants the defendant's motion to withdraw the 
defendant's plea of not guilty. 
ooem 
Case Number: 951900533 FS 
The defendant waives the reading of the information. 
After the court examined the defendant, the defendant enters a 
plea of guilty to: 
(2) AGGRAVATED ROBBERY (First Degree Felony) 
(3) AGGRAVATED ROBBERY # ^J^First Degree Felony) 
(6) ATT AGG KIDNAPPING ^x^t[Soeen& Degree Felony) 
(7) KIDNAPPING (Second Degree Felony) 
(8) KIDNAPPING (Second Degree Felony) 
(10) KIDNAPPING (Second Degree Felony) 
The court orders counts 1, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 
dismissed. 
The defendant is advised of his/her rights. 
The defendant waives the right to be sentenced at the time 
prescribed by statute, and sentencing is set for: 
EVENT: SENTENCING ADDRESS: METRO. HALL OF JUSTICE 
DATE : SEPTEMBER 14, 1995 240 EAST 400 SOUTH 
TIME : 9:00 AM SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
PLACE: ROOM 3 04 JUDGE : ANNE M. STIRBA 
The defendant is referred for a Pre-sentence Investigation report 
from ADULT PROBATION & PAROLE. ADULT PROBATION & PAROLE is notified. 
The court orders that the defendant be remanded to the custody of 
County Sheriff. 
Also appearing for the defendant is Patrick Anderson. Also appearing 
for the State are Neil Gunnarson and Walter Ellett. 
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Bailiff j ^ - . 
Date f h S 
y\|(irnirirr 
D The motion of . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted O denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; # plea of guilty; 
D plea ofpo contest; of the offense of ft^fl T%dbhf f r^ | , a felony 
of the I ^ deg/ef, p a class misderrtBatior, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
by N» (^f\ftarfr<f\ is now adjudged guilty rC/fl represented by 
of the above offense 
E^ftf . and the State being represented I 
, lsnow sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
years and which may be for life; D to a maximum mandatory term of 
D not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
)S of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; ^ * 
V and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of %2(?00 " p6us GS% S U r c J o ^ ^ e . 
tf and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of %JJWL~L t n " f a y R>il f\Ui<. frotji^irng 
Cilftc^vsr* -for a\\ \iicM**s . 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
are hereby dismissed. 
ftfW 4 W U$P. 
% such sentence is to run consecutively with €&fJr\ CPurv4-
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (O prison) sentence and placed on probation in the (o 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
Q Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
St> 
*CCJU)\£ 
and i prisoned in accordance with this J 
(4 Commitment shall issue T ^ r 4 ^ W i 4 * \ 
DATED this H^c day 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
of 645ftrb»rV\Krr9 $<£ 
Deputy County Attorney Page J. of ? 
'VAHAM^jAji/PnaaA/APAPt IP**—OtyfonM) (Gold*nrod—Stat*) 000181 
O"1^ 
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE 
Based upon the plea of the defendant, the defendant's admissions in open court, and the charge contained in the 
Information, the Court finds that the defendant used a firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm in 
the commission or furtherance of the offense of which the defendant has been adjudged guilty; 
Judge's 
W^ m^" and it is orde^c^hat the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for a 
term Bfof 5A^yel§&runot to exceed five years, as provided by law for the use of a firearm or 
facsimile or the representation of a firearm in the commission or furtherance of the offense of 
which the defendant has been adjudged guilty. Such sentence shall run consecutively and 
not concurrently with the basic sentence set forth above. 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT 
Upon finding that the defendant is in the status of a habitual criminal, the defendanat is sen-
tenced to: 
D not less than five years and which may be for life at the Utah State Prison. 
DATED this / t P 3 ^
 d a y o f f>^^m\ryr- , 19 ? S " . 
Page <r of —L 
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Date ^gprrsmber / 4 , /<W<r 
D The motion of . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is O granted O denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant baving beeq convicted by D a jury; D the court; t& plea of guilty; 
D plea qfjno contest; of the offense of nO& 
of the l - ^ * degree,.• a class misderrreani 
jo fl  
Koho St. f ., a felony 
represented 
of the above offense; rsnow s 
or, being now present in court and ready for sentence and r s t i c 
iby&JL* , and the State being represented by i v IJlUirYSavSSfl is now adjudged guilty 
entenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
2d of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
^ o ^1<?7 
O and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $. to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with _ 
JS such sentence is to run consecutively with g f l r i k r<OUift*r 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
D 
D 
are hereby dismissed. 
Defendant is granted a stay of the above (O prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County G for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
/ Tday of JS&2A&£^9 3£ 
M Commitment shall issue 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page J_of_2_ 
— _ I . . M ~ . * < v ^ . * « _ ima/DriMA/ApftPi (Pink—Defamal (GokfcnroO— SUtt) 000183 
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE 
Based upon the plea of the defendant, the defendant's admissions in open court, and the charge contained in the 
Information, the Court finds that the defendant used a firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm in 
the commission or furtherance of the offense of which the defendant has been adjudged guilty; 
Judge's y 
,n,tj?W * w 
p nfo^flf and it is orgeredJfianiie defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for a 
term fcof^S^ye^orunot to exceed five years, as provided by law for the use of a firearm or 
facsimile or the representation of a firearm in the commission or furtherance of the offense of 
which the defendant has been adjudged guilty. Such sentence shall run consecutively and 
not concurrently with the basic sentence set forth above. 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT 
Upon finding that the defendant is in the status of a habitual criminal, the defendanat is sen-
tenced to: 
D not less than five years and which may be for life at the Utah State Prison. 





IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
Plaintiff, . (COMMITMENT) 
vs. I Case No. 
( ^ i A n ^ W j \ k M o d m U \ Honorable ffiflvy^M. 5^V^g| 
^
 v
 ( cierk rv-n hprr\g 
\JCX\\ . 1 Reporter 6 • ]Nar rtclc 
Bailiff Y~ (Vig. 
Defendant. D a t e — 5 t n p ^ r V \ i ^ r H , l ^ f 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having b$en convicted by D a jury; D the court; &p)ea of guilty; 
D plea ofpo contest; of the offense of r \ 4 l — n ^ a — K I a » r \ Q p p l i r v ^ , a felony 
of t h * | y rtpgrpe, D a class misdemeanor, being now present inucoufTand ready for sentence and 
represented by ^  Twvf^Srx ' a n d t h e S t a t e be jn9 represented by M Qj4iyyQir!SorNs now adjudged guilty 
of the above offehse?1s^owsentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; ^ ~-n 
Rf of not less than five years and which may be for life; ^ ^ 0 ^ 1& I 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with _ 
K such sentence is to run consecutively with CO^k CoUfeVr 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
D _ _ 
O Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
a Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or G for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
J& Commitment shall issue * * ^ - m u ^ < 4 h — _ j^<i oft 
DATED this / i d a y o f ^ttfrtldwCW 3f? x - ^ JT<^Z^i 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: V ^ J ^ H K ^ V Q V 1 12 LLS^XJ 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page 
000185 
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE 
Based upon the plea of the defendant, the defendant's admissions in open court, and the charge contained in the 
Information, the Court finds that the defendant used a firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm in 
the commission or furtherance of the offense of which the defendant has been adjudged guilty; 
Judge's 
Initials 
and it is oc^edUiatthe defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for a 
term J5of W y r a r ^ o r u not to exceed five years, as provided by law for the use of a firearm or 
facsimile or the representation of a firearm in the commission or furtherance of the offense of 
which the defendant has been adjudged guilty. Such sentence shall run consecutively and 
not concurrently with the basic sentence set forth above. 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT 
Upon finding that the defendant is in the status of a habitual criminal, the defendanat is sen-
tenced to: 
D not less than five years and which may be for life at the Utah State Prison. 
DATED this / 4 ^ . day of 
Ck^m 
DISTRICT COURT J 
Page & of —- f 
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Count No. J 3 
Honorable 
cierk fA. ;Thnrr# 
Defendant. 
f^ - Wfirflfclr. Reporter 
Bailiff ,—
 | 1 i n u 
D The motion of . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; l&plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of r%>t>f\nftplw^ . a felony U( of the ££%L degree, D a class misdemeanor nor, beingiY ow present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented h y < \ ^ ^ i w / \ , and the State being represented by N- nunMtrsnr\ is now adjudged guilty 
>f tehsferfif^owsentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: of the above of 
D to a maximum mandatory term of 
O not to exceed five years; 
H of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
O of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
years and which may be for life; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $- to 
2.^0 2.1 ?7 
CAcK GgUh,4 
O such sentence is to run concurrently with 
Sf such sentence is to run consecutively with 
a upon motion of o State, O Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
D 
a 
are hereby dismissed. 
Defendant is granted a stay of the above (Q prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
O Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or O for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
$f Commitment shall issue 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page 
(White-Court) (Or^n—Jodot) (YtHow—Jalt/Pnton/APftP) (Ptnk—Ottentt) (GoMtnrod—State) 000187 
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Count No. J&. j-
Honorable A w ^ l V t •Sfryka 
Clerk N T - T h o r n s 






phwtw^ IT; l ^ r 
D The motion of . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is G granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; • the court; &plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of K l r i r v ^ p p l ^ , a felony 
of the ^ L^Tdegree, • a class misdemeanor, being now present jq court and ready for sentence and 
Mi/Yi)rsnr\ is now adjudged guilty 
**J2^ degr , a m i 
represented K Y ^ Cb^^^ a n d t h e S t a t e be i n9 represented byN- $Lti\\ 
of the above offehreTfrfi^w sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of 
a not to exceed five years; 
yi of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
O of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
years and which may be for life; 
Z2-0 2.^01 
O and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $. to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
H such sentence is to run consecutively with ( V K J U Clou 
D upon motion of O State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
D 
are hereby dismissed. 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (O prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
O Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
tti Commitment shall issue 
DATED this / * f c i day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DISTRICT COUR 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney 
(WhKt-Court) (G«Mfl-Judg*) (Y««ow-J*W»i»on/AP»P) (W«*-Ot«in««) (OoManreO-Statt) 
Page 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
JUDGMENT, 8ENTENCE 
Plaintiff.
 N (COMMITMENT) 
vs. I Case No. 
f ^ t A n G r a > e p k KorvVDi |q \ Honorable P^fiC> W> ^>4ifta 
<Scc\ 
Clerk fA.^fKorrtf'. 
Reporter ^7 Wf\rr\\<?lrr 
Bailiff j L Jvj 
Defendant 
iliff k . l /t£ 
Date g > a p W E w y N} \qpur 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted O denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; IS plea of guilty; 
O plea of no contest; of the offense of i v , a felony 
of the .SL^degree, D a class misdemeanor, beincfnow present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by fc ^fcfy^pjfl
 t and the State being represented by /v(3uftrcx^6fl is n o w adjudged guilty 
of the above offfcri&rtsfrotf'sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; ^ ~n 
J^T of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; -2- ^0 *2- [ V I 
O of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
a and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ • 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
BT such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
D 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (O prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
O Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or O for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. y ^ T o T / ^ ^ 
$ Commitment shall issue 
DATED this / 7 day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
>fl)fcrnkr, 19 351 
f M C T D l / ^ T ^ / " U » l f DISTRICT COURT Jl 
Defense Counsel 
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• 1ST DEGREE . PERSON CRIMES . OTHER CRIMES 











































6 MON 1 
5 MON 1 
4 MON 1 
3 MON 1 
3 MON 1 
36 MON 
v ^ ^ ^ i CONS5CUTIVEENHANCEMENTS — 
j j p a t f t ^ 24 MON j 1 ^ » g ^ J 12 MON 112 MON 6 MON 3 MON 3 MON 
18 MON 
| CONCURRENT ENHANCEMENTS ADDED BY B.O.P. 1 
15 MON I 12 MON I 9 MON 1 6 MON j 6 MON | 3 MON 3 MON 3MON 
DRUG DISTRIBUTION OF OR INTENT TO DIST. OVER $500 & RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY SHOULD BE -PERSON" CRIMES 
ACTIVE 0©N¥10TI©NS 
MOST SERIOUS t) A/U, & A r W 7 U 
NEXT MOST SERIOUS*lML 'feflfte**! 
OTHER i)kH ALL\£x***+Pt±/~ 
OTHER H-6J) £ t t t ,W>Ai<V fecov^s) 
DEGREE YEARS MONTHS 
I lo 
& t~3 X o c U > o c £v 
J2M 
«t.«fVU"\. ^ U 
^ '
 6
^ A L JO Jfe 
SENTENCES SHOULD GENERALLY BE CONCURRENT. HOWEVER, THE EXISTENCE 
OF THE FOLLOWING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES SUGGEST CONSIDERATION 
OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: 
1. ESCAPE OR FUGITIVE 
ff/UNDER SUPERVISION OR BAIL RELEASE WHEN OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED 
T . UNUSUAL VICTIM VUNERABILITY 
4. INJURY TO PERSON OR PROPERTY LOSS WAS EXTREME FOR CRIME CATEGORY 
5. OFFENSE CHARACTERIZED BY EXTREME CRUELTY OR DEPRAVITY 
IF THE SENTENCES ARE TO BE CONSECUTIVE, USE THE CONSECUTIVE ENCHANEMENTS 
PORTION OF THE TIME MATRIX" FOR ALL CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES EXCEPT THE 
"MOST SERIOUS" CONVICTION. 
Form 4 
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